Tag: Transhumanism

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(Featured) The Metaphysics of Transhumanism

The Metaphysics of Transhumanism

Eric T. Olson investigates the concept of “Parfitian transhumanism” and its metaphysical implications. Named after the British philosopher Derek Parfit, Parfitian transhumanism explores the transformation of human identity and existence, primarily through the lens of “psychological continuity,” in a potential future era of advanced technological interventions in human biology and cognition. The author effectively uses this article as a platform to address the intricate relationship between identity, existence, and psychological continuity in a transhumanist context, a discourse that not only challenges traditional philosophical perspectives but also provides compelling insights into the possible future of human evolution.

Olson posits psychological continuity as a cornerstone of Parfitian transhumanism, suggesting a shift in focus from physical to psychological in understanding personal identity and survival. In delineating this shift, the author challenges the traditional concept of survival as an identity-preserving process and presents a more nuanced understanding of survival as contingent upon psychological continuity and connectedness. This reassessment of survival reframes the philosophical discourse on identity and existence in a transhumanist context.

Concept of Psychological Continuity

The concept of psychological continuity serves as a critical pivot in the author’s exploration of Parfitian transhumanism. This perspective posits identity not as static or inherently tied to the physical form, but as a flowing narrative, a continuum shaped by psychological similarities and connectedness over time. It is in this context that the author examines the dynamics of identity preservation in future scenarios where advanced technology may facilitate radical transformations in human existence. By positing psychological continuity as a defining factor of identity, the author challenges the traditional philosophical precept of identity as predominantly physical or material and redirects our attention towards psychological factors such as memory, cognition, and personality traits.

Within this framework, the author presents an interesting argument by contrasting the survival of physical identity with that of psychological continuity. The traditional understanding of survival, as discussed in the article, assumes a direct correlation between the survival of the physical self and that of personal identity. However, the author contends that this correlation does not necessarily hold in scenarios that involve ‘nondestructive uploading,’ where an individual’s psychological profile is preserved in an electronic entity while leaving the physical self intact. By invoking this notion, the author further entrenches the concept of psychological continuity as a central theme of Parfitian transhumanism, questioning the sufficiency of physical continuity as a measure of survival and prompting a deeper exploration of this psychological dimension of identity.

Parfitian Transhumanism and the Martian Hypothetical

Parfitian transhumanism ushers in a new paradigm for considering the implications of future human transformations via technological advancements. Grounded in Derek Parfit’s notion of psychological continuity, this perspective critically reassesses our conceptions of identity and survival in a post-human context. Through a series of hypothetical scenarios, the author teases out the potential divergence between psychological continuity and personal survival. They expose an intriguing inconsistency: even in the presence of a psychologically continuous successor, the psychological original tends to express a clear preference for its own welfare. Such examples underscore the complexities inherent in Parfitian transhumanism and call into question the very premises of identity and survival, invoking a reevaluation of our prudential attitudes towards future selves and prompting a profound discourse on the future of human identity in an era of rapid technological advancement.

For example, the author’s innovative “Martian hypothetical” presents us with a scenario wherein an exact psychological replica of a human, an “electronic person,” is created non-destructively and is subjected to differing experiences, including torture. The scenario illuminates an intriguing paradox: even when a psychological clone exists, the original self shows a clear preference for its own welfare, suggesting a disconnect between psychological continuity and personal survival. This paradox, as presented by the author, poses a profound ethical question regarding the status of psychological replicas, asking us to contemplate the validity of selfish concern in the face of seemingly identical psychological entities. By probing these issues, the author deepens our philosophical understanding of identity, survival, and ethics in the face of prospective technological advancements.

The Prudential Concerns and Broader Philosophical Discourse

The examination of prudential concerns within the transhumanist paradigm provides a valuable contribution to philosophical discourse. While the article articulates the notion of psychological continuity as the core of personal identity, it also raises doubts about the sufficiency of this concept for prudential concern – the interest one has in their own future experiences. In scenarios such as nondestructive uploading, despite perfect psychological continuity with the electronic replica, the author notes a discernible preference for one’s own physical continuity. This observation seems to contradict the notion of equivalency between psychological continuity and survival, indicating a potential disparity between philosophical and prudential perspectives on identity. The author’s rigorous analysis thus prompts us to reassess assumptions about the centrality of psychological continuity to personal identity, prompting further deliberation on the complex relationship between continuity, survival, and prudential interests in the philosophical sphere.

The author’s critique of Parfitian transhumanism emerges from an analysis of the disjunction between psychological continuity and prudential interest, providing a contribution to the larger discourse on personal identity and the ethics of futuristic technology. This line of inquiry echoes and amplifies long-standing philosophical debates about the nature of the self and the conditions for its survival. While the author’s skepticism regarding the adequacy of psychological continuity in defining survival is noteworthy, it further fuels the ongoing philosophical discussions around personal identity, transhumanism, and their ethical implications. In contextualizing this argument within the broader philosophical landscape, the author subtly invites a more profound dialogue between traditional theories of identity and the ever-evolving concept of transhumanism, thereby enriching the conversation in the field of futures studies.

Abstract

Transhumanists want to free us from the constraints imposed by our humanity by means of “uploading”: extracting information from the brain, transferring it to a computer, and using it to create a purely electronic person there. That is supposed to move us from our human bodies to computers. This presupposes that a human being could literally move to a computer by a mere transfer of information. The chapter questions this assumption, then asks whether the procedure might be just as good, as far as our interests go, even if it could not move us to a computer.

The Metaphysics of Transhumanism
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(Featured) Modifying the Environment or Human Nature? What is the Right Choice for Space Travel and Mars Colonisation?

Modifying the Environment or Human Nature? What is the Right Choice for Space Travel and Mars Colonisation?

Maurizio Balistreri and Steven Umbrello engage in a critical exploration of the philosophical, ethical, and practical implications of human space travel and extraterrestrial colonization. The authors offer an in-depth analysis of two main strategies proposed in the literature: terraforming (geoengineering) and human bioenhancement. The first approach implies transforming extraterrestrial environments, such as Mars, to make them habitable for human life. The second approach involves modifying the human genetic heritage to make us more resilient and adaptable to non-terrestrial environments. The authors meticulously scrutinize these alternatives, considering not only feasibility and cost but also the ethical and philosophical implications.

The authors underscore the potential of terraforming as a method to establish human settlements on Mars. However, this possibility raises several ethical concerns, including the potential destruction of extraterrestrial life forms, the alteration of untouched landscapes, and the potential overstepping of human dominion. On the other hand, human bioenhancement, though a promising path, engenders its own set of ethical dilemmas. The authors caution against reckless enthusiasm for genetic modification, drawing attention to the potential creation of a new ‘human species’ and the consequent risk of divisions and misunderstandings.

A central theme in the article is the comparison of natural and artificial constructs. The authors challenge the assumption that the natural is always superior to the artificial. Drawing on posthumanist perspectives, they suggest that, given our influence on Earth’s environment, nature is already an artificial product. The argument is extended to other planets, indicating that the traditional dichotomy between the natural and the artificial may not hold in the context of extraterrestrial colonization.

The article contributes to broader philosophical discourses about the human relationship with nature and our place in the universe. It resonates with themes of transhumanism and posthumanism, contemplating the potential of technology to overcome human vulnerabilities and achieve a new evolutionary stage. The authors invite us to question and possibly redefine our notions of ‘natural’ and ‘artificial.’ This study, therefore, serves as a significant touchstone for futures studies, linking the practical considerations of space travel with philosophical reflections on human nature and our interaction with the environment.

For future research, the authors’ comparative analysis of terraforming and human bioenhancement opens several avenues. While the ethical implications of both strategies have been discussed, a more comprehensive ethical framework could be developed, perhaps drawing on principles of bioethics, environmental ethics, and space ethics. Additionally, the potential of hybrid approaches combining elements of both strategies could be explored. Lastly, given the increasing likelihood of extraterrestrial colonization, a more detailed analysis of the potential social, cultural, and psychological impacts on human populations in these new environments would be a valuable contribution.

Abstract

As space travel and intentions to colonise other planets are becoming the norm in public debate and scholarship, we must also confront the technical and survival challenges that emerge from these hostile environments. This paper aims to evaluate the various arguments proposed to meet the challenges of human space travel and extraterrestrial planetary colonisation. In particular, two primary solutions have been present in the literature as the most straightforward solutions to the rigours of extraterrestrial survival and flourishing: (1) geoengineering, where the environment is modified to become hospitable to its inhabitants, and (2) human (bio)enhancement where the genetic heritage of humans is modified to make them more resilient to the difficulties they may encounter as well as to permit them to thrive in non-terrestrial environments. Both positions have strong arguments supporting them but also severe philosophical and practical drawbacks when exposed to different circumstances. This paper aims to show that a principled stance where one position is accepted wholesale necessarily comes at the opportunity cost of the other where the other might be better suited, practically and morally. This paper concludes that case-by-case evaluations of the solutions to space travel and extraterrestrial colonisation are necessary to ensure moral congruency and the survival and flourishing of astronauts now and into the future.

Modifying the Environment or Human Nature? What is the Right Choice for Space Travel and Mars Colonisation?
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(Featured) Weak transhumanism: moderate enhancement as a non-radical path to radical enhancement

Weak transhumanism: moderate enhancement as a non-radical path to radical enhancement

Cian Brennan argues for a version of transhumanism that incrementally applies moderate enhancements to future human beings, rather than pursuing radical enhancements in a more immediate and extreme manner. The paper begins by presenting the critique of transhumanism put forward by Johnathan Agar, which centers on the potential negative consequences of radical enhancement. The author argues that Agar’s critique is aimed at the effects of radical enhancement, rather than the concept of radical enhancement itself. By assuming that radical enhancement will be applied gradually to future generations, the author argues that weak transhumanism can overcome Agar’s objections.

The author then discusses objections to weak transhumanism, including the potential for an eventual radical enhancement to emerge and the difficulty of identifying when an enhancement becomes radical. The author responds to these objections by proposing a checklist of characteristic features that can be used to identify radical enhancements, such as the creation of new or extended abilities, changes in moral status, and significant changes in vulnerability or relatability between the enhanced and unenhanced.

Overall, the paper provides a nuanced and detailed defense of weak transhumanism, offering a way to pursue radical enhancements while avoiding some of the potential negative consequences of more radical approaches. The paper engages with a range of objections and provides a thoughtful and well-supported response to each, drawing on both philosophical and scientific sources.

The paper has implications for broader philosophical issues surrounding the ethics of human enhancement, the relationship between technology and society, and the nature of human identity and personhood. By focusing on the incremental application of enhancements, the paper raises questions about the degree to which human beings can be transformed by technology without losing their essential human nature. It also highlights the role of societal values and norms in shaping the development and application of enhancement technologies.

Future research in this area could build on the author’s checklist of characteristic features of radical enhancements, exploring the extent to which these features are necessary and sufficient conditions for defining radical enhancements. Further research could also examine the potential consequences of weak transhumanism, including the ways in which incremental enhancements may interact with each other over time and the potential for unintended consequences. Finally, future research could explore the social and cultural dimensions of transhumanism, including the ways in which transhumanist values and practices may be shaped by factors such as gender, race, and socioeconomic status.

Abstract

Transhumanism aims to bring about radical human enhancement. In ‘Truly Human Enhancement’ Agar (2014) provides a strong argument against producing radically enhancing effects in agents. This leaves the transhumanist in a quandary—how to achieve radical enhancement whilst avoiding the problem of radically enhancing effects? This paper aims to show that transhumanism can overcome the worries of radically enhancing effects by instead pursuing radical human enhancement via incremental moderate human enhancements (Weak Transhumanism). In this sense, weak transhumanism is much like traditional transhumanism in its aims, but starkly different in its execution. This version of transhumanism is weaker given the limitations brought about by having to avoid radically enhancing effects. I consider numerous objections to weak transhumanism and conclude that the account survives each one. This paper’s proposal of ‘weak transhumanism’ has the upshot of providing a way out of the ‘problem of radically enhancing effects’ for the transhumanist, but this comes at a cost—the restrictive process involved in applying multiple moderate enhancements in order to achieve radical enhancement will most likely be dissatisfying for the transhumanist, however, it is, I contend, the best option available.

Weak transhumanism: moderate enhancement as a non-radical path to radical enhancement