(Review) Three mistakes in the moral mathematics of existential risk

Mismeasuring Long-term Risks

David Thorstad engages with the philosophy of longtermism and navigates its implications for existential risk mitigation. The grounding concept of longtermism revolves around the potential vastness of the future, considering the numerous lives and experiences that could exist. Within this framework, Thorstad probes the concept of astronomical waste, a central tenet for longtermists, which posits that the obliteration of potential future lives due to existential catastrophe would result in a colossal loss. Thorstad accepts this foundational proposition, which is also widely recognized within the longtermist community. However, his exploration does not halt here; it extends into an elaborate scrutiny of the complexities and uncertainties that may surface while operationalizing this perspective in the realm of existential risk mitigation.

Thorstad does not simply acquiesce to longtermist conventions; instead, he examines and dissects these principles to draw out latent uncertainties and nuances. With each section of his paper, he scrutinizes the longtermist premises and its implications for existential risk mitigation. By doing so, he reveals hidden layers within the longtermist argument and uncovers practical and ethical concerns that often get overshadowed by the basic premises of this philosophy. Thorstad’s work, therefore, stands not as a mere affirmation of longtermism, but as an essential critique that brings to light the intricate moral and practical conundrums that lurk within its core propositions. His thorough examination aims to enrich the understanding of longtermism, laying the groundwork for future debates and discussions on the philosophy of existential risk mitigation.

Intergenerational Coordination Problem, Background Risk, and Population Dynamics

A noteworthy aspect of Thorstad’s analysis is his framing of existential risk mitigation as an intergenerational coordination problem. Thorstad postulates that for humanity to accrue significant benefits from such mitigation, it must suppress cumulative risk over prolonged periods. This poses a challenge, as each generation must ensure that future generations continue to reduce risk. According to Thorstad, this coordination problem is difficult due to four reasons. Firstly, desired risk levels are quite low and might require considerable sacrifice. Secondly, each generation carries only a fraction of the cost of potential catastrophe, requiring an unusual concern for future generations. Thirdly, this level of concern is challenging to instill given human impatience and limited altruism. Finally, enforcement is complicated because monitoring and punishing future generations’ potential selfishness is difficult, increasing the temptation to defect from a collectively optimal solution. By placing the problem within this frame, Thorstad opens up pertinent questions around feasibility and ethical considerations regarding intergenerational coordination.

Thorstad also critically examines the relationship between background existential risk and the value of mitigation efforts, producing insights that challenge conventional views. The argument rests on the premise that if background risk levels are raised, the value of mitigating any specific risk, such as biosecurity threats, significantly diminishes. This counterintuitive relationship suggests that a world with reduced biosecurity risks would still be a risky world, thus more vulnerable to future catastrophes. Thorstad extends this point by demonstrating that pessimistic assumptions about the background level of existential risk can drastically lessen the value of a fixed relative or absolute risk reduction. Intriguingly, this argument suggests a “dialectical flip” in debates on existential risk. Paradoxically, higher levels of background risk tend to lower the importance of risk mitigation, and lower levels enhance it. This revelation has potential implications for the Time of Perils Hypothesis, a foundational principle stating that risk will soon decline substantially and stay low for the rest of human history. Thorstad underscores that this hypothesis is crucial for arguing the astronomical importance of existential risk mitigation when background risk is high. However, he and others question its validity, implying further doubts about the value of existential risk mitigation.

The exploration into population dynamics, demographic interventions, and the significance of digital minds imparts another dimension to the discourse on longtermism. Thorstad scrutinizes the interplay between the potential number of lives a region can sustain and the likely number of lives it will support, given the dynamics of human populations. This insight implies that efforts to increase future human population size could be as important as mitigating existential risk. However, Thorstad notes the intricacies of this assertion as it depends on the framework of population axiology. Further, Thorstad introduces the potential role of digital minds, arguing that digital populations programmed to value expansion might outperform humans in expanding to a meaningful proportion of their maximum possible size. This argument suggests that future efforts might need to prioritize the development and safety of digital populations, possibly at the expense of future human populations, accentuating the profound ethical implications surrounding longtermism and its practical execution.

The Cluelessness Problem and Model Uncertainty, Connections to the Broader Philosophical Discourse

The cluelessness problem, as Thorstad explains, lies in the immense difficulty of predicting the consequences of our actions on the distant future, an issue further exacerbated when considering the global stakes of existential risks. Some longtermists believe that existential risk mitigation could alleviate this problem, as current risks can be identified and strategies for mitigation can be crafted today. However, Thorstad offers an alternative perspective, suggesting that cluelessness may persist due to ‘model uncertainty.’ His argument posits that the complexity inherent in valuing existential risk mitigation could mean there are still unknown variables or considerations that have been overlooked or misrepresented in the current models. This presents a cautionary note, suggesting that the escape from cluelessness via existential risk mitigation may be an overoptimistic assumption. Thorstad leaves readers contemplating the level of model uncertainty and the potential for other unexplored variables in longtermist thinking.

Thorstad’s article contributes significantly to the broader philosophical discourse, especially in the context of moral philosophy and ethical futures studies. By articulating the intergenerational coordination problem, he engages with concepts central to intergenerational justice, a core topic within the ethics of long-term thinking. Further, his exploration of ‘background risk’ and ‘the time of perils’ hypothesis contributes to the discourse around existential risk philosophy, offering a novel viewpoint that challenges traditional assumptions about existential risk mitigation. Moreover, his argument concerning population dynamics and digital minds intersects with philosophy of mind and metaphysics, advancing the philosophical understanding of these complex notions. Thorstad’s discussion on the ‘cluelessness problem’ and ‘model uncertainty’ carries implications for epistemology and decision theory, underlining the complexities associated with making predictions about the distant future and creating models for such projections. His study not only scrutinizes the presuppositions within longtermist philosophy, but also invites further inquiry into the associated philosophical dimensions, thereby expanding the theoretical terrain of futures studies.

Abstract

Longtermists have recently argued that it is overwhelmingly important to do what we can to mitigate existential risks to humanity. I consider three mistakes that are often made in calculating the value of existential risk mitigation: focusing on cumulative risk rather than period risk; ignoring background risk; and neglecting population dynamics. I show how correcting these mistakes pushes the value of existential risk mitigation substantially below leading estimates, potentially low enough to threaten the normative case for existential risk mitigation. I use this discussion to draw four positive lessons for the study of existential risk: the importance of treating existential risk as an intergenerational coordination problem; a surprising dialectical flip in the relevance of background risk levels to the case for existential risk mitigation; renewed importance of population dynamics, including the dynamics of digital minds; and a novel form of the cluelessness challenge to longtermism.

Three mistakes in the moral mathematics of existential risk

(Featured) Plausibility in models and fiction: What integrated assessment modellers can learn from an interaction with climate fiction

Plausibility in models and fiction: What integrated assessment modellers can learn from an interaction with climate fiction

Van Beek and Versteeg investigate the convergence of Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) and climate fiction, a nexus previously underexplored in academic discourse. The authors articulate a vision of how these seemingly disparate domains — scientific modelling and literary narratives — can collaboratively contribute to the depiction of plausible future scenarios. Their exploration engages a comparative framework, dissecting the narrative structures inherent within both IAMs and climate fiction, thereby adding a significant dimension to the evolving field of futures studies and climate change research. The authors contend that the interplay of scientific and narrative storytelling methods is a crucial element in building a comprehensive understanding of potential future environments.

The focus of this comparative study is not to undermine the role of IAMs in developing climate change scenarios, but rather to shed light on the uncharted territory of potential complementarity between the narrative models employed by IAMs and climate fiction. Van Beek and Versteeg’s objective, as they posit, is to illuminate the manner in which storytelling techniques in IAMs and fiction can foster an engaging dialogue, promoting a shared understanding of the complexities surrounding climate change. They argue that such an intersection of disciplines can provide a platform for broader public engagement and democratic participation, thereby amplifying the impact of both IAMs and fiction within the realm of climate change policy and discourse. Their work constitutes a methodical examination of this interplay, its inherent potential, and its prospective contributions to the philosophy of futures studies.

Methodology and Comparative Framework

The authors engaged a comparative analysis of three climate change narratives, two from climate fiction and one from the IAMs. This approach illuminated the inherent narrative structures in IAMs and climate fiction, offering profound insights into the potential complementarity of the two domains. The selection criteria for the narratives rested on their capacity to portray future climate scenarios. It is notable that the authors viewed the IAM, despite being a mathematical model, as capable of narrative storytelling—a rather unconventional perspective that fortifies their comparative framework.

A pivotal element in their comparative framework is the application of Hayden White’s narrative theory. By viewing IAMs through this lens, the authors were able to decipher the hidden narratives within scientific models, thus challenging the traditional view of these models as purely objective and devoid of narrative elements. They used White’s theory as a basis for understanding the “storyline” in IAMs, juxtaposing it with narrative techniques used in climate fiction. The subtleties uncovered during this examination provided a foundation for the argument that IAMs, similar to works of fiction, employ specific storytelling techniques to illustrate future climate scenarios. This approach of incorporating a literary theory into the analysis of scientific models reflects a compelling methodological innovation in the field of futures studies.

Storyline and Physical Setting

In their analysis, the authors found that while both IAMs and climate fiction share a common goal of illustrating potential climate outcomes, they diverge in the ways they construct their storylines and depict their settings. Climate fiction, as exemplified by the chosen narratives, heavily draws upon human experiences and emotions, whereas IAMs provide a more abstract, numerical portrayal of potential futures. Furthermore, in the aspect of physical setting, IAMs tend to remain global in scope, offering a broad, aggregate view of future climate changes. In contrast, climate fiction places its narrative within specific, recognizable locales, thus making the potential impacts of climate change more relatable to the reader. This differential in perspective between the local and the global, the personal and the aggregate, provides a powerful insight into how the medium influences the message in climate change narratives.

IAMs’ strengths reside primarily in providing quantifiable, wide-scale predictions, a feature that is largely absent in the more narrative-driven climate fiction. However, both mediums converge in their objective of projecting climate futures, albeit through contrasting modalities. While climate fiction is rooted in the narrative tradition of storytelling, emphasizing personal experiences and emotional resonance, IAMs adhere to an empirical, numerical approach. This dichotomy, as Van Beek and Versteeg propose, is not a barrier but rather a source of complementarity. The humanization of climate change through fiction can aid in the comprehension and internalization of the statistical data presented by IAMs. Conversely, the empirical grounding provided by IAMs serves as a counterpoint to the speculative narratives of climate fiction, thereby creating a comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to envisaging future climate scenarios.

Bridging IAMs and Climate Fiction

Van Beek and Versteeg reason that the numerical and probabilistic nature of IAMs, coupled with the narrative, emotionally resonant strength of climate fiction, can create a comprehensive model that leverages the strengths of both. The authors argue that the merger of these modalities not only broadens the bandwidth of climate change representation, but also intensifies public engagement and understanding. Their suggestion to embed narratives into IAMs outlines a potential pathway towards achieving this symbiosis. The hypothetical, yet grounded, scenarios provided by climate fiction narratives can, as per Van Beek and Versteeg, humanize and add depth to the statistical information presented by IAMs, thereby enriching the discourse and future study of climate change.

The authors emphasize the novel notion that an amalgamation of data-driven IAMs and emotive narratives from climate fiction holds the potential to significantly enrich our comprehension of future climate scenarios, as well as galvanize a wider engagement from the public. Moreover, they suggest that their approach, if effectively implemented, could establish a more nuanced, accessible, and comprehensive climate discourse, thereby facilitating greater societal understanding and action. The implications of their research are profound; it paves the way for a unique and interdisciplinary trajectory within the philosophy of futures studies, urging scholars to explore the compelling intersection of quantitative models and narrative storytelling in the context of climate change.

Abstract

Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are critical tools to explore possible pathways to a low-carbon future. By simulating complex interactions between social and climatic processes, they help policymakers to systematically compare mitigation policies. However, their authoritative projections of cost-effective and technically feasible pathways restrict more transformative low-carbon imaginaries, especially because IAM pathways are often understood in terms of probability rather than plausibility. We suggest an interaction with climate fiction could be helpful to address this situation. Despite fundamental differences, we argue that both IAMs and climate fiction can be seen as practices of storytelling about plausible future worlds. For this exploratory article, we staged conversations between modellers and climate fiction writers to compare their respective processes of storytelling and the content of both their stories and story-worlds, focusing specifically on how they build plausibility. Whereas modellers rely on historical observations, expert judgment, transparency and rationality to build plausibility, fiction writers build plausibility by engaging with readers’ life worlds and experience, concreteness and emotionally meaningful details. Key similarities were that both modellers and fiction writers work with what-if questions, a causally connected story and build their stories through an iterative process. Based on this comparison, we suggest that an interaction between IAMs and climate fiction could be useful for improving the democratic and epistemic qualities of the IAM practice by 1) enabling a more equal dialogue between modellers and societal actors on plausible futures and 2) critically reflecting upon and broadening the spectrum of plausible futures provided by IAMs.

Plausibility in models and fiction: What integrated assessment modellers can learn from an interaction with climate fiction