Stephen Francis Mann and Daniel Gregory endeavor to explore the possibility of inner speech in artificial intelligence, specifically within an AI assistant. The researchers employ a Turing-like test, which involves a conversation with a chatbot to assess its linguistic competence, creativity, and reasoning. Throughout the experiment, the chatbot is asked a series of questions designed to probe its capabilities and discern whether it possesses the capacity for inner speech.
The researchers find mixed evidence to support the presence of inner speech in the AI chatbot. While the chatbot claims to have inner speech, its performance on sentence completion tasks somewhat corroborates this assertion. However, its inconsistent performance on rhyme-detection tasks, particularly when involving non-words, raises doubts regarding the presence of inner speech. The authors also note that the chatbot’s responses can be explained by its highly advanced autocomplete capabilities, which further complicates the evaluation of its inner speech.
Ultimately, the paper questions the efficacy of Turing-like tests as a means to determine mental states or mind-like properties in artificial agents. It suggests that linguistic competence alone may not be sufficient to ascertain whether AI possesses mind-like properties such as inner speech. The authors imply that those who argue against the plausibility of mental states in AI agents might reason that the absence of minds in conversation agents proves that linguistic competence is an insufficient test for mind-like properties.
This research taps into broader philosophical issues, such as the nature of consciousness and the criteria required to attribute mental states to artificial agents. As AI continues to advance, the demarcation between human and machine becomes increasingly blurred, forcing us to reevaluate our understanding of concepts like inner speech and consciousness. The question of whether AI can possess inner speech underscores the need for a more robust philosophical framework that can accommodate the unique characteristics and capabilities of artificial agents.
Future research in this domain could benefit from exploring alternative methods for evaluating inner speech in AI, going beyond Turing-like tests. For instance, researchers might investigate the AI’s decision-making processes or the mechanisms that underpin its creativity. Additionally, interdisciplinary collaboration with fields such as cognitive science and neuroscience could shed light on the cognitive processes at play in both humans and AI agents, thus providing a richer context for understanding the nature of inner speech in artificial agents. By expanding the scope of inquiry, we can better assess the extent to which AI agents possess mind-like properties and develop a more nuanced understanding of the implications of such findings for the future of AI and human cognition.
Abstract
In November 2022, OpenAI released ChatGPT, an incredibly sophisticated chatbot. Its capability is astonishing: as well as conversing with human interlocutors, it can answer questions about history, explain almost anything you might think to ask it, and write poetry. This level of achievement has provoked interest in questions about whether a chatbot might have something similar to human intelligence or even consciousness. Given that the function of a chatbot is to process linguistic input and produce linguistic output, we consider the question whether a sophisticated chatbot might have inner speech. That is: Might it talk to itself, internally? We explored this via a conversation with ‘Playground’, a chatbot which is very similar to ChatGPT but more flexible in certain respects. We asked it questions which, plausibly, can only be answered if one first produces some inner speech. Here, we present our findings and discuss their philosophical significance.
Might text-davinci-003 have inner speech?