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(Featured) Limits of conceivability in the study of the future. Lessons from philosophy of science

Limits of conceivability in the study of the future. Lessons from philosophy of science

Veli Virmajoki explores the epistemological and conceptual limitations of futures studies, and offers an enlightening perspective in the philosophical discourse on the conceivability of future possibilities. Utilizing three case studies from the philosophy of science as the crux of its argument, the paper meticulously dissects how these limitations pose significant obstacles in envisaging alternatives to the present state of affairs. The author poses a thought-provoking argument centered on the constraints imposed by our current understanding of reality and the mechanisms it employs to reinforce its own continuity and inevitability.

The backbone of this philosophical inquiry lies in the robust debate between inevitabilism, a stance asserting the inevitable development of specific scientific theories, and contingentism, a view that endorses the potentiality of genuinely alternative scientific trajectories. The exploration of this contentious issue facilitates a deeper understanding of the constraints in predicting future scenarios, as our ability to conceptualize these alternatives is bound by our understanding of past and present realities. The paper deftly argues that the choice between inevitabilism and contingentism is fundamentally intertwined with our personal intuition about the range of genuine possibilities, thereby asserting the subjective nature of perceived futurity. As such, the article offers a fresh, critical lens to scrutinize the underpinnings of futures studies, and instigates a profound rethinking of our philosophical approach to anticipating what lies ahead.

Unconceived Possibilities and their Consequences

The author asserts that our conception of potential futures is significantly limited by profound epistemological and conceptual factors. They draw on the case study of the late 19th-century ether theories in physics, where, despite the existence of genuinely alternative theories, only a limited number of possibilities were conceived due to prevailing scientific practices and principles. The author uses this historical case to illustrate that while some futures may seem inconceivable from our present vantage point, they may still fall within the realm of genuine possibilities.

Moreover, the author argues that the potential impact of these unconceived possibilities extends beyond the localized elements of a system to reverberate throughout its entirety. This underlines the complexity of the task in futures studies; any unconceived alternatives in one sector of a system can trigger significant, far-reaching consequences for the entire system. Therefore, the research warns against oversimplification in predicting future scenarios and emphasizes the need for a nuanced approach that recognizes the interconnectedness of elements within any given system. This presents a remarkable challenge for futures studies, highlighting the depth of the iceberg that lies beneath the surface of our current epistemological and conceptual understanding.

Historical Trajectories and Justification of Future Possibilities

In the examination of plausibility and the justification of future possibilities, the article underscores the fundamental epistemological and conceptual challenges that limit our capability to predict alternative futures. The author refers to historical episodes like the case of Soviet cybernetics, where the existence of plausible alternative futures was not recognized, due to the collective failure to see past the status quo. It brings to light the inherent difficulties in justifying the plausibility or even the possibility of certain futures, where our current knowledge systems and conceptual frameworks may blind us to divergent scenarios. This observation raises pertinent questions about the inherent biases of our epistemic practices, as well as the potential for deeply entrenched beliefs to restrict our ability to imagine and evaluate a broader range of future possibilities. Hence, this line of inquiry necessitates the careful examination of the underlying assumptions that might constrain the scope of our foresight and deliberations on future possibilities.

The article further discusses the concept of historical trajectories and their connection to future possibilities, offering a philosophical lens into the entanglement of past, present, and future. It argues that our understanding of history and future possibilities, and our interpretation of the present’s robustness and inevitability, are inextricably linked through a complex web of modal considerations. The author emphasizes the interconnectedness of past trajectories and future possibilities, arguing that the way we perceive historical possibilities affects how we anticipate future outcomes. This perspective allows us to examine whether it is the deterministic view of history (inevitabilism) or the contingency of events (contingentism) that should be the default position, a determination that would have profound implications for our understanding of future possibilities.

Inevitabilism vs. Contingentism

Tthe author elaborates on a crucial dichotomy in philosophy of science: inevitabilism versus contingentism. Inevitabilism implies a deterministic understanding of scientific and historical development, where the present state of affairs appears as the unique and necessary outcome of the past. Contingentism, on the other hand, endorses the idea of multiple genuine alternatives to the current state, thus opening the space of historical and future possibilities. The article underscores that these positions are not simply academic disputes but carry substantial implications for how we conceive possibilities for the future. Moreover, these divergent outlooks reflect the individual’s inherent beliefs and intuitions about the range of possibilities within human affairs. The author contends that these perspectives cannot conclusively advocate for or against alternative futures because one’s stance on the inevitabilism versus contingentism debate inherently relies on their preconceived notions of the scope of historical and future possibilities.

Future Research Avenues

In light of the research as presented, promising avenues for future research emerge. The author suggests a systematic examination of the epistemological and conceptual boundaries of our ability to conceive and reason about potential futures. Such an investigation is not limited to philosophical discourse but requires interdisciplinary dialogue with a myriad of fields, as these boundaries are, in part, shaped by our social and scientific structures. This method of research would offer a comprehensive understanding of the creative and critical capacities of futures studies and aid us in recognizing our epistemological and conceptual predicament concerning future possibilities. Furthermore, it could potentially expose the manner in which these boundaries are historically mutable, opening up a discussion about the renegotiation of the boundaries of conceivability.

Abstract

In this paper, the epistemological and conceptual limits of our ability to conceive and reason about future possibilities are analyzed. It is argued that more attention should be paid in futures studies on these epistemological and conceptual limits. Drawing on three cases from philosophy of science, the paper argues that there are deep epistemological and conceptual limits in our ability to conceive and reason about alternatives to the current world. The nature and existence of these limits are far from obvious and become visible only through careful investigation. The cases establish that we often are unable to conceive relevant alternatives; that historical and counterfactual considerations are more limited than has been suggested; and that the present state of affairs reinforces its hegemony through multiple conceptual and epistemological mechanisms. The paper discusses the reasons behind the limits of the conceivability and the consequences that follow from the considerations that make the limits visible. The paper suggests that the epistemological and conceptual limits in our ability to conceive and reason about possible futures should be mapped systematically. The mapping would provide a better understanding of the creative and critical bite of futures studies.

Limits of conceivability in the study of the future. Lessons from philosophy of science
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(Featured) Future value change: Identifying realistic possibilities and risks

Future value change: Identifying realistic possibilities and risks

The advent of rapid technological development has prompted philosophical investigation into the ways in which societal values might adapt or evolve in response to changing circumstances. One such approach is axiological futurism, a discipline that endeavors to anticipate potential shifts in value systems proactively. The research article at hand makes a significant contribution to the developing field of axiological futurism, proposing innovative methods for predicting potential trajectories of value change. This article from Jeroen Hopster underscores the complexity and nuance inherent in such a task, acknowledging the myriad factors influencing the evolution of societal values.

His research presents an interdisciplinary approach to advance axiological futurism, drawing parallels between the philosophy of technology and climate scholarship, two distinct yet surprisingly complementary fields. Both fields, it argues, share an anticipatory nature, characterized by a future orientation and a firm grounding in substantial uncertainty. Notably, the article positions climate science’s sophisticated modelling techniques as instructive for philosophical studies, promoting the use of similar predictive models in axiological futurism. The approach suggested in the article enriches the discourse on futures studies by integrating strategies from climate science and principles from historical moral change, presenting an enlightened perspective on the anticipatory framework.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of the article is rooted in the concept of axiological possibility spaces, a means to anticipate future moral change based on a deep historical understanding of past transformations in societal values. The researcher proposes that these spaces represent realistic possibilities of value change, where ‘realism’ is a function of historical conditioning. To illustrate, processes of moralisation and demoralisation are considered historical markers that offer predictive insights into future moral transitions. Moralisation is construed as the phenomenon wherein previously neutral or non-moral issues acquire moral significance, while demoralisation refers to the converse. As the research paper posits, these processes are essential to understanding how technology could engender shifts in societal values.

In particular, the research identifies two key factors—technological affordances and the emergence of societal challenges—as instrumental in driving moralisation or demoralisation processes. The author suggests that these factors collectively engender realistic possibilities within the axiological possibility space. Notably, the concept of technological affordances serves to underline how new technologies, by enabling or constraining certain behaviors, can precipitate changes in societal values. On the other hand, societal challenges are posited to stimulate moral transformations in response to shifting social dynamics. Taken together, this theoretical framework stands as an innovative schema for the anticipation of future moral change, thereby contributing to the discourse of axiological futurism.

Axiological Possibility Space and Lessons from Climate Scholarship

The concept of an axiological possibility space, as developed in the research article, operates as a predictive instrument for anticipating future value change in societal norms and morals. This space is not a projection of all hypothetical future moral changes, but rather a compilation of realistic possibilities. The author defines these realistic possibilities as those rooted in the past and present, inextricably tied to the historical conditioning of moral trends. Utilizing historical patterns of moralisation and demoralisation, the author contends that these processes, in concert with the introduction of new technologies and arising societal challenges, provide us with plausible trajectories for future moral change. As such, the axiological possibility space serves as a tool to articulate these historically grounded projections, offering a valuable contribution to the field of anticipatory ethics and, more broadly, to the philosophy of futures studies.

A central insight from the article emerges from the intersection of futures studies and climate scholarship. The author skillfully extracts lessons from the way climate change prediction models operate, particularly the CMIP models utilized by the IPCC, and their subsequent shortcomings in the face of substantial uncertainty. The idea that the intricacies of predictive modeling can sometimes overshadow the focus on potentially disastrous outcomes is critically assessed. The author contends that the realm of axiological futurism could face similar issues and hence should take heed. Notably, the call for a shift from prediction-centric frameworks to a scenario approach that can articulate the spectrum of realistic possibilities is emphasized. This scenario approach, currently being developed in climate science under the term “storyline approach,” underlines the importance of compound risks and maintains a robust focus on potentially high-impact events. The author suggests that the axiological futurist could profitably adopt a similar strategy, exploring value change in technomoral scenarios, to successfully navigate the deep uncertainties intrinsic to predicting future moral norms.

Integration into Practical Fields and Relating to Broader Philosophical Discourse

The transfer of the theoretical discussion into pragmatic fields is achieved in the research with a thoughtful examination of its potential applications, primarily in value-sensitive design. By suggesting a need for engineers to take into consideration the dynamics of moralisation and demoralisation, the author not only proposes a shift in perspective, but also creates a bridge between theoretical discourse and practical implementation. Importantly, it is argued that a future-proof design requires an assessment of the probability of embedded values shifting in moral significance over time. The research paper goes further, introducing a risk-based approach to the design process, where engineers should not merely identify likely value changes but rather seek out those changes that render the design most vulnerable from a moral perspective. The mitigation of these high-risk value changes then becomes a priority in design adaptation, solidifying the article’s argument that axiological futurism is an essential tool in technological development.

The author’s analysis also presents a substantial contribution to the broader philosophical discourse, notably the philosophy of futures studies and the ethics of technology. By integrating concepts from climatology and axiology, the work demonstrates an interdisciplinary approach that enriches philosophical discourse, emphasizing how diverse scientific fields can illuminate complex ethical issues in technology. Importantly, the work builds on and critiques the ideas of prominent thinkers like John Danaher, pushing for a more diversified and pragmatic approach in axiological futurism, rather than a singular reliance on model-based projections. The research also introduces the critical notion of “realistic possibilities” into the discourse, enriching our understanding of anticipatory ethics. It advocates for a shift in focus towards salient normative risks, drawing parallels to climate change scholarship and highlighting the necessity for anticipatory endeavours to be both scientifically plausible and ethically insightful. This approach has potential for a significant impact on philosophical studies concerning value change and the ethical implications of future technologies.

Future Research Directions

The study furnishes ample opportunities for future research in the philosophy of futures studies, particularly concerning the integration of its insights into practical fields and its implications for anticipatory ethics. The author’s exploration of axiological possibility spaces remains an open-ended endeavor; further work could be conducted to investigate the specific criteria or heuristic models that could guide ethical assessments within these spaces. The potential application of these concepts in different technological domains, beyond AI and climate change, also presents an inviting avenue of inquiry. Moreover, as the author has adopted lessons from climate scholarship, similar interdisciplinary approaches could be employed to incorporate insights from other scientific disciplines. Perhaps most intriguingly, the research introduces a call for a critical exploration of “realistic possibilities,” an area that is ripe for in-depth theoretical and empirical examination. Future research could build upon this foundational concept, investigating its broader implications, refining its methodological underpinnings, and exploring its potential impact on policy making and technological design.

Abstract

The co-shaping of technology and values is a topic of increasing interest among philosophers of technology. Part of this interest pertains to anticipating future value change, or what Danaher (2021) calls the investigation of ‘axiological futurism’. However, this investigation faces a challenge: ‘axiological possibility space’ is vast, and we currently lack a clear account of how this space should be demarcated. It stands to reason that speculations about how values might change over time should exclude farfetched possibilities and be restricted to possibilities that can be dubbed realistic. But what does this realism criterion entail? This article introduces the notion of ‘realistic possibilities’ as a key conceptual advancement to the study of axiological futurism and offers suggestions as to how realistic possibilities of future value change might be identified. Additionally, two slight modifications to the approach of axiological futurism are proposed. First, axiological futurism can benefit from a more thoroughly historicized understanding of moral change. Secondly, when employed in service of normative aims, the axiological futurist should pay specific attention to identifying realistic possibilities that come with substantial normative risks.

Future value change: Identifying realistic possibilities and risks
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(Featured) Friendly AI will still be our master. Or, why we should not want to be the pets of super-intelligent computers

Friendly AI will still be our master. Or, why we should not want to be the pets of super-intelligent computers

As our technological capabilities advance at an accelerating pace, so too does the pertinence of the hypothetical conundrum posed by super-intelligent artificial intelligence (AI) and its implications for human freedom. Robert Sparrow examines these implications, drawing extensively from political philosophy and conceptions of agency, and provides an analysis of the societal implications of super-intelligence from a uniquely philosophical standpoint. The author adopts a nuanced perspective, proposing that even benevolent, friendly AI may threaten human freedom in its capability to dominate, consciously or not, its human counterparts. It is this paradox, situated within the broader philosophical discourse of freedom versus domination, that provides the nucleus of this analysis.

The research is grounded in the seminal work of philosopher Philip Pettit, particularly his doctrine of republican freedom. This doctrine centers on the belief that freedom is not merely the absence of interference (negative liberty) but is, critically, the absence of domination or the ability to interfere at will. Pettit famously encapsulated this concept in his metaphor of the “eyeball test,” positing that one is free only when they can look others in the eye without fear or subservience. As we explore the intersection of Pettit’s philosophy and the hypothetical reality of a super-intelligent AI, the profound significance of this test in determining the future of human freedom in a world shared with AI comes sharply into focus.

The “Friendly AI” Problem

Robert Sparrow makes an acute distinction between “friendly” AI and its potential to dominate humanity. The Friendly AI problem stems from the plausible notion that super-intelligent AI, regardless of its benevolence or adherence to human values, may still pose a significant threat to human freedom due to its inherent capacity for domination. A benevolent AI could feasibly operate in a dictatorial manner, modulating its interference in human life based on its determination of human interests. However, a critical distinction must be drawn: a benevolent dictator, even though acting in our interests, is still a dictator. As the author of the article pointedly remarks, to be “free” to act as one wishes only at the behest of another entity, even a well-meaning one, is not true freedom.

Herein lies the crux of the Friendly AI problem: the ability of an AI entity to act in accordance with human interests does not automatically guarantee human freedom. Freedom, as delineated by the republicanism of Pettit, requires resilience; it must not dissolve upon the whims of a more powerful entity. Thus, for the exercise of power by AI to be compatible with human freedom, it must be possible for humans to resist it. One might propose that a genuinely Friendly AI would solicit human input before interfering in our affairs, serving as an efficient executor of our will rather than as a prescriptive entity. Yet, this proposition does not satisfactorily resolve the core tension between AI’s power and freedom and our own. Ultimately, any freedom we might enjoy under a superintelligent AI would be contingent upon the AI’s will, a position which reveals the inherent vulnerability and potential for domination inherent in the Friendly AI concept.

Superintelligence

Bostrom’s notion of Superintelligence, as outlined by Sparrow, posits an AI entity capable of outperforming the best human brains in nearly every economically relevant field. However, the potential domination by such an entity forms the bedrock of the philosophical conflict between benevolence and domination. Drawing on Pettit’s theory of republicanism, it becomes clear that benevolence alone, even if perfectly calibrated to human interests, does not suffice to guarantee freedom. The very ability of a superintelligent AI to interfere unilaterally in human affairs, regardless of its intent, embodies the antithesis of Pettit’s non-domination principle. The analysis further draws attention to the paradox inherent in relying on an external, powerful entity for the regulation of our interests, effectively highlighting the existential risk associated with superintelligent AI. While a superintelligent AI may act in line with human interests, its potential for domination raises questions about the plausibility of achieving a truly “Friendly AI”, a challenge that resonates with the larger discourse on freedom and domination in philosophical studies.

Freedom, Status, and the ‘Eyeball Test’

The question of human freedom in the context of a superintelligent AI intersects with Pettit’s conceptualization of the ‘eyeball test’. In his philosophy, the notion of freedom pivots on the individual’s status within society – a status conferred when one can ‘look others in the eye without reason for fear or deference’. This perspective becomes especially poignant when viewed in the light of a superintelligent entity’s potential dominion. Under such circumstances, the capacity for humans to pass the ‘eyeball test’ could be seriously undermined, as the superintelligent AI, by virtue of its cognitive superiority, could induce both fear and deference. The state of being subjected to the AI’s superior will could consequently impair our ability to ‘look it in the eye’, thereby eroding the human status required for true freedom. This analysis deepens the philosophical understanding of freedom and its inextricable link with status, while simultaneously challenging the concept of a ‘Friendly AI’ from the perspective of republican theory.

The Negative Liberty Doctrine and Technocratic Framing of AI

Berlin’s bifurcation of liberty into negative and positive spheres finds particular resonance in the context of superintelligent AI, and as such, provides a useful framework for interpreting the dominance problem. From a negative liberty perspective – that is, the absence of coercion or interference – the advent of a superintelligent AI could be seen as promoting freedom. However, the technocratic framing of AI, often characterized by an overemphasis on instrumental logic and utility maximization, may inadvertently favor this negative liberty doctrine, potentially to the detriment of positive freedom. This is to say, while an AI’s superior decision-making capabilities could minimize human interference in various spheres of life, it could also inadvertently curtail positive freedom – the opportunity for self-realization and autonomy. As such, this underscores the importance of incorporating broader philosophical considerations into AI research and development, beyond the narrow confines of technocratic perspectives.

This fusion of philosophy and AI research necessitates the introduction of considerations beyond the merely technical and into the sphere of ethics and moral philosophy. The potential for domination by superintelligent AI systems underscores the need for research that specifically targets these concerns, particularly in relation to upholding principles of human dignity, autonomy, and positive freedom. However, achieving this requires a re-evaluation of our current paradigms of AI development that often valorize utility maximization and efficiency. Instead, an approach that truly appreciates the full depth of the challenge must also involve a careful examination of the philosophical underpinnings that inform the design and operation of AI systems. As such, future research in this arena ought to be a collaborative effort between philosophers, ethicists, AI researchers, and policymakers, aimed at defining a coherent set of values and ethical guidelines for the development and use of superintelligent AI.

Abstract

When asked about humanity’s future relationship with computers, Marvin Minsky famously replied “If we’re lucky, they might decide to keep us as pets”. A number of eminent authorities continue to argue that there is a real danger that “super-intelligent” machines will enslave—perhaps even destroy—humanity. One might think that it would swiftly follow that we should abandon the pursuit of AI. Instead, most of those who purport to be concerned about the existential threat posed by AI default to worrying about what they call the “Friendly AI problem”. Roughly speaking this is the question of how we might ensure that the AI that will develop from the first AI that we create will remain sympathetic to humanity and continue to serve, or at least take account of, our interests. In this paper I draw on the “neo-republican” philosophy of Philip Pettit to argue that solving the Friendly AI problem would not change the fact that the advent of super-intelligent AI would be disastrous for humanity by virtue of rendering us the slaves of machines. A key insight of the republican tradition is that freedom requires equality of a certain sort, which is clearly lacking between pets and their owners. Benevolence is not enough. As long as AI has the power to interfere in humanity’s choices, and the capacity to do so without reference to our interests, then it will dominate us and thereby render us unfree. The pets of kind owners are still pets, which is not a status which humanity should embrace. If we really think that there is a risk that research on AI will lead to the emergence of a superintelligence, then we need to think again about the wisdom of researching AI at all.

Friendly AI will still be our master. Or, why we should not want to be the pets of super-intelligent computers
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(Featured) The Ethics of Terminology: Can We Use Human Terms to Describe AI?

The Ethics of Terminology: Can We Use Human Terms to Describe AI?

The philosophical discourse on artificial intelligence (AI) often negotiates the boundary of the human-anthropocentric worldview, pivoting around the use of human attributes to describe and assess AI. In this context, the research article by Ophelia Deroy presents a compelling inquiry into our linguistic and cognitive tendency to ascribe human characteristics, particularly “trustworthiness,” to artificial entities. In an attempt to unravel the philosophical implications and ramifications of this anthropomorphism, the author explores three conceptual frameworks – new ontological category, extended human-category, and Deroy’s semi-propositional beliefs. The divergence among these perspectives underscores the complexity of the issue, highlighting how our conceptions of AI shape our interactions with and attitudes towards it.

In addition to ontological and communicative aspects, the article scrutinizes the legal dimension of AI personhood. It analyzes the merits and shortcomings of the legal argument for ascribing personhood to AI, juxtaposing it with the established notion of corporate personhood. Although this comparison offers certain pragmatic and epistemic advantages, it does not unequivocally endorse the uncritical application of human terminology to AI. Through this multi-faceted analysis, the research article integrates perspectives from philosophy, cognitive science, and law, extending the ongoing discourse about AI into uncharted territories. The examination of AI within this framework thus emerges as an indispensable part of philosophical futures studies.

Understanding Folk Concepts of AI

The exploration of folk concepts of AI is critical in understanding how people conceive and interpret artificial intelligence within their worldview. Ophelia Deroy meticulously dissects these concepts by challenging the prevalent ascription of ‘trustworthiness’ to AI. The article emphasizes the potential mismatch between our cognitive conception of trust in humans and the attributes usually associated with AI, such as reliability or predictability. The focus is not only on the logical inconsistencies of such anthropomorphic attributions but also on the potential for miscommunication they could engender, especially given the complexity and variability of the term ‘trustworthiness’ across cultures and languages.

The author employs an interesting analytical angle by exploring the notion of AI as a possible extension of the human category, or alternatively, as a distinct ontological category. The question at hand is whether people perceive AI as fundamentally different from humans or merely view them as extreme non-prototypical cases of humans. This consideration reflects the complex cognitive landscape we navigate when dealing with AI, pointing towards the potential ontological ambiguity surrounding AI. Understanding these folk concepts and the mental models they reflect not only enriches our comprehension of AI from a sociocultural perspective but also yields important insights for the development and communication strategies of AI technologies.

Human Terms and their Implications, Legal Argument

The linguistic choice of using human terms such as “trustworthiness” to describe AI, arguably entrenched in anthropocentric reasoning, poses substantial problems. The author identifies three interpretations of how people categorize AI: an extension of the human category, a distinct ontological category, or a semi-propositional belief akin to religious or spiritual constructs. This last interpretation is particularly illuminating, suggesting that people might hold inconsistent beliefs about AI without considering them irrational. This offers a crucial insight into how human language shapes our understanding and discourse about AI, potentially fostering misconceptions. Yet, the author points out, there is a lack of empirical evidence supporting the appropriateness of applying such human-centric terms to AI, raising questions about the legitimacy of this linguistic practice in both scientific and broader public contexts.

In the discussion of AI’s anthropomorphic portrayal, Deroy introduces a compelling legal perspective. Drawing parallels with the legal status granted to non-human entities like corporations, the author investigates whether AI could be treated as a “legal person,” a concept that could reconcile the use of human terms in AI discourse. However, this argument presents its own set of challenges and limitations. The text using such terms must clearly state that the analogical use of “trust” is with respect to legal persons and not actual persons, a nuance often overlooked in many texts. Moreover, the justification for using such legal fiction must weigh the potential benefits against possible costs or risks, a task best left to legal experts. Thus, despite its merits, the legal argument does not provide an unproblematic justification for humanizing AI discourse.

The Broader Philosophical Discourse and Future Directions

This study is an important contribution to the broader philosophical discourse, illuminating the intersection of linguistics, ethics, and futures studies. The argument challenges the conventional notion of language as a neutral medium, stressing the normative power of language in shaping societal perception of AI. This aligns with the poststructuralist argument that reality is socially constructed, extending it to a technological context. The insight that folk concepts, embedded in language, influence our collective vision of AI’s role echoes phenomenological philosophies which underscore the role of intersubjectivity in shaping our shared reality. The ethical implications arising from the anthropomorphic portrayal of AI resonate with moral philosophy, particularly debates on moral agency and personhood. Thus, this study reinforces the growing realization that philosophical reflections are integral to our navigation of an increasingly AI-infused future.

Furthermore, the research points towards several promising avenues for future investigation. The most apparent is an extension of this study across diverse cultures and languages to explore how varying linguistic contexts may shape differing conceptions of AI, revealing cultural variations in anthropomorphizing technology. A comparative study might yield valuable insights into the societal implications of folk concepts across the globe. Additionally, an exploration into the real-world impact of anthropomorphic language in AI discourse, such as its effects on policy-making and public sentiment towards AI, would be an enlightening sequel. Lastly, this work paves the way for developing an ethical framework to guide the linguistic portrayal of AI in public discourse, a timely topic given the accelerating integration of AI into our daily lives. Thus, this research sets a fertile ground for multidisciplinary inquiries into linguistics, sociology, ethics, and futures studies.

Abstract

Despite facing significant criticism for assigning human-like characteristics to artificial intelligence, phrases like “trustworthy AI” are still commonly used in official documents and ethical guidelines. It is essential to consider why institutions continue to use these phrases, even though they are controversial. This article critically evaluates various reasons for using these terms, including ontological, legal, communicative, and psychological arguments. All these justifications share the common feature of trying to justify the official use of terms like “trustworthy AI” by appealing to the need to reflect pre-existing facts, be it the ontological status, ways of representing AI or legal categories. The article challenges the justifications for these linguistic practices observed in the field of AI ethics and AI science communication. In particular, it takes aim at two main arguments. The first is the notion that ethical discourse can move forward without the need for philosophical clarification, bypassing existing debates. The second justification argues that it’s acceptable to use anthropomorphic terms because they are consistent with the common concepts of AI held by non-experts—exaggerating this time the existing evidence and ignoring the possibility that folk beliefs about AI are not consistent and come closer to semi-propositional beliefs. The article sounds a strong warning against the use of human-centric language when discussing AI, both in terms of principle and the potential consequences. It argues that the use of such terminology risks shaping public opinion in ways that could have negative outcomes.

The Ethics of Terminology: Can We Use Human Terms to Describe AI?
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(Featured) Predictive policing and algorithmic fairness

Predictive policing and algorithmic fairness

Tzu-Wei Hung and Chun-Ping Yen contribute to the discursive field of predictive policing algorithms (PPAs) and their intersection with structural discrimination. They examine the functioning of PPAs, and lay bare their potential for propagating existing biases in policing practices and thereby question the presumed neutrality of technological interventions in law enforcement. Their investigation underscores the technological manifestation of structural injustices, adding a critical dimension to our understanding of the relationship between modern predictive technologies and societal equity.

An essential aspect of the authors’ argument is the proposition that the root of the problem lies not in the predictive algorithms themselves, but in the biased actions and unjust social structures that shape their application. Their article places this contention within the broader philosophical context, emphasizing the often-overlooked social and political underpinnings of technological systems. Thus, it offers a pertinent contribution to futures studies, prompting a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between (hotly anticipated) advanced technologies like PPAs and the structural realities of societal injustice. The authors provide a robust challenge to deterministic narratives around technology, pointing to the integral role of societal context in determining the impact of predictive policing systems.

Conceptualizing Predictive Policing

Hung and Yen Scrutinize the correlation between data inputs, algorithmic design, and resultant predictions. Their analysis disrupts the popular conception of PPAs as inherently objective and unproblematic, instead illuminating the mechanisms by which structural biases can be inadvertently incorporated and perpetuated through these algorithmic systems. The article’s critical scrutiny of PPAs further elucidates the relational dynamics between data, predictive modeling, and the societal contexts in which they are deployed.

The authors advance the argument that the implications of PPAs extend beyond individual acts of discrimination to reinforce broader systems of structural bias and social injustice. By focusing on the role of PPAs in reproducing existing patterns of discrimination, they elevate the discussion beyond a simplistic focus on technological neutrality or objectivity, situating PPAs within a larger discourse on technological complicity in the perpetuation of social injustices. This perspective fundamentally challenges conventional thinking about PPAs, prompting a shift from an algorithm-centric view to one that acknowledges the socio-political realities that shape and are shaped by these technological systems.

Structural Discrimination, Predictive Policing, and Theoretical Frameworks

The study goes further in its analysis by arguing that discrimination perpetuated through PPAs is, in essence, a manifestation of broader structural discrimination within societal systems. This perspective illuminates the connections between predictive policing and systemic power imbalances, rendering visible the complex ways in which PPAs can reify and intensify existing social injustices. The authors critically underline the potentially negative impact of stakeholder involvement in predictive policing, postulating that equal participation may unintentionally replicate or amplify pre-existing injustices. The analysis posits that the sources of discrimination lie in biased police actions reflecting broader societal inequities rather than the algorithmic systems themselves. Hence, addressing these challenges necessitates a focus not merely on rectifying algorithmic anomalies, but on transforming the unjust structures that they echo.

The authors propose a transformative theoretical framework, referred to as the social safety net schema, which envisions PPAs as integrated within a broader social safety net. This schema reframes the purpose and functioning of PPAs, advocating for their use not to penalize but to predict social vulnerabilities and facilitate requisite assistance. This is a paradigm shift from crime-focused approaches to a welfare-oriented model that situates crime within socio-economic structures. In this schema, the role of predictive policing is reimagined, with crime predictions used as indicators of systemic inequities that necessitate targeted interventions and redistribution of resources. With this reorientation, predictive policing becomes a tool for unveiling societal disparities and assisting in welfare improvement. The implementation of this schema implies a commitment to equity rather than just equality, addressing the nuances and complexities of social realities and aiming at the underlying structures fostering discrimination.

Community and Stakeholder Involvement, and Implications for Future Research

The issue of stakeholder involvement is addressed with both depth and nuance. Acknowledging the criticality of involving diverse stakeholders in the governance and control of predictive policing technology, the authors assert that equal participation could inadvertently reproduce the extant societal disparities. In their view, a stronger representation of underrepresented groups in decision-making processes is vital. This necessitates more resources and mechanisms to ensure their voices are heard and acknowledged in shaping public policies and social structures. The role of local communities in this process is paramount; they act as informed advocates, ensuring the proper understanding and representation of disadvantaged groups. This framework, hence, pivots on a bottom-up approach to power and control over policing, ensuring democratic community control and fostering collective efficacy. The approach is envisioned to counterbalance the persisting inequality, thereby reducing the likelihood of discrimination and improving community control over policing.

The analysis brings forth notable implications for future academic inquiries and policy-making. It endorses the importance of scrutiny of social structures rather than the predictive algorithms themselves as the catalyst for discriminatory practices in predictive policing. This view drives the necessity of further research into the multifaceted intersection between social structures, law enforcement, and advanced predictive technologies. Moreover, it prompts consideration of how policies can be implemented to reflect this understanding, centering on creating a socially aware and equitable technological governance structure. The policy schema of the social safety net for predictive policing, as proposed by the authors, offers a starting point for such a discourse. Future research may focus on implementing and testing this schema, critically examining its effectiveness in mitigating discriminatory impacts of predictive policing, and identifying potential adjustments necessary for enhancing its efficiency and inclusivity. In essence, future inquiries and policy revisions should foster a context-sensitive, democratic, and community-focused approach to predictive policing.

Abstract

This paper examines racial discrimination and algorithmic bias in predictive policing algorithms (PPAs), an emerging technology designed to predict threats and suggest solutions in law enforcement. We first describe what discrimination is in a case study of Chicago’s PPA. We then explain their causes with Broadbent’s contrastive model of causation and causal diagrams. Based on the cognitive science literature, we also explain why fairness is not an objective truth discoverable in laboratories but has context-sensitive social meanings that need to be negotiated through democratic processes. With the above analysis, we next predict why some recommendations given in the bias reduction literature are not as effective as expected. Unlike the cliché highlighting equal participation for all stakeholders in predictive policing, we emphasize power structures to avoid hermeneutical lacunae. Finally, we aim to control PPA discrimination by proposing a governance solution—a framework of a social safety net.

Predictive policing and algorithmic fairness
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(Featured) Cognitive architectures for artificial intelligence ethics

Cognitive architectures for artificial intelligence ethics

The landscape of artificial intelligence (AI) is a complex and rapidly evolving field, one that increasingly intersects with ethical, philosophical, and societal considerations. The role of AI in shaping our future is now largely uncontested, with potential applications spanning an array of sectors from healthcare to education, logistics to creative industries. Of particular interest, however, is not merely the surface-level functionality of these AI systems, but the cognitive architectures underpinning them. Cognitive architectures, a theoretical blueprint for cognitive and intelligent behavior, essentially dictate how AI systems perceive, think, and act. They therefore represent a foundational aspect of AI design and hold substantial implications for how AI systems will interact with, and potentially transform, our broader societal structures.

Yet, the discourse surrounding these architectures is, to a large extent, bifurcated between two paradigms: the biological cognitive architecture and the functional cognitive architecture. The biological paradigm, primarily drawing from neuroscience and biology, emphasizes replicating the cognitive processes of the human brain. On the other hand, the functional paradigm, rooted more in computer science and engineering, is concerned with designing efficient systems capable of executing cognitive tasks, regardless of whether they emulate human cognitive processes. This fundamental divergence in design philosophy thus embodies distinct assumptions about the nature of cognition and intelligence, consequently shaping the way AI systems are created and how they might impact society. It is these paradigms, their implications, and their interplay with AI ethics principles, that form the main themes of this essay.

Frameworks for Understanding Cognitive Architectures and the Role of Mental Models in AI Design

Cognitive architectures, central to the progression of artificial intelligence, encapsulate the fundamental rules and structures that drive the operation of an intelligent agent. The research article situates its discussion within two dominant theoretical frameworks: symbolic and connectionist cognitive architectures. Symbolic cognitive architectures, rooted in the realm of logic and explicit representation, emphasize rule-based systems and algorithms. They are typified by their capacity for discrete, structured reasoning, often relating to high-level cognitive functions such as planning and problem-solving. This structured approach carries the advantage of interpretability, affording clearer insights into the decision-making processes.

On the other hand, connectionist cognitive architectures embody a divergent perspective, deriving their inspiration from biological neural networks. Connectionist models prioritize emergent behavior and learning from experience, expressed in the form of neural networks that adjust synaptic weights based on input. These architectures have exhibited exceptional performance in pattern recognition and adaptive learning scenarios. However, their opaque, ‘black-box’ nature presents challenges to understanding and predicting their behavior. The interplay between these two models, symbolizing the tension between the transparent but rigid symbolic approach and the flexible but opaque connectionist approach, forms the foundation upon which contemporary discussions of cognitive architectures in AI rest.

The incorporation of mental models in AI design represents a nexus where philosophical interpretations of cognition intersect with computational practicalities. The use of mental models, i.e., internal representations of the world and its operational mechanisms, is a significant bridge between biological and functional cognitive architectures. This highlights the philosophical significance of mental models in the study of AI design: they reflect the complex interplay between the reality we perceive and the reality we construct. The efficacy of mental models in AI system design underscores their pivotal role in knowledge acquisition and problem-solving. In the biological cognitive framework, mental models mimic human cognition’s non-linear, associative, and adaptive nature, thereby conforming to the cognitive isomorphism principle. On the other hand, the functional cognitive framework employs mental models as pragmatic tools for efficient task execution, demonstrating a utilitarian approach to cognition. Thus, the role of mental models in AI design serves as a litmus test for the philosophical assumptions underlying distinct cognitive architectures.

Philosophical Reflections and AI Ethics Principles in Relation to Cognitive Architectures

AI ethics principles, primarily those concerning autonomy, beneficence, and justice, possess substantial implications for the understanding and application of cognitive architectures. If we consider the biological framework, ethical considerations significantly arise concerning the autonomy and agency of AI systems. To what extent can, or should, an AI system with a human-like cognitive structure make independent decisions? The principle of beneficence—commitment to do good and prevent harm—profoundly impacts the design of functional cognitive architectures. Here, a tension surfaces between the utilitarian goal of optimized task execution and the prevention of potential harm resulting from such single-mindedness. Meanwhile, the principle of justice—fairness in the distribution of benefits and burdens—prompts critical scrutiny of the societal consequences of both architectures. As these models become more prevalent, we must continuously ask: Who benefits from these technologies, and who bears the potential harms? Consequently, the intricate intertwining of AI ethics principles with cognitive architectures brings philosophical discourse to the forefront of AI development, establishing its pivotal role in shaping the future of artificial cognition.

The philosophical discourse surrounding AI and cognitive architectures is deeply entwined with the ethical, ontological, and epistemological considerations inherent to AI design. On an ethical level, the discourse probes the societal implications of these technologies and the moral responsibilities of their developers. The questions of what AI is and what it could be—an ontological debate—become pressing as cognitive architectures increasingly mimic the complexities of the human mind. Furthermore, the epistemological dimension of this discourse explores the nature of AI’s knowledge acquisition and decision-making processes. This discourse, therefore, cannot be separated from the technological progression of AI, as the philosophical issues at play directly inform the design choices made. Thus, philosophical reflections are not merely theoretical musings but tangible influences on the future of AI and, by extension, society. As AI continues to evolve, the ongoing dialogue between philosophy and technology will be critical in guiding its development towards beneficial and ethical ends.

Future Directions for Research

Considering the rapid advancement of AI, cognitive architectures, and their deep-rooted philosophical implications, potential avenues for future research appear vast and multidimensional. It would be valuable to delve deeper into the empirical examination of cognitive architectures’ impact on decision-making processes in AI, quantitatively exploring their effect on AI reliability and behavior. A comparative study across different cognitive architecture models, analyzing their benefits and drawbacks in diverse real-world contexts, would further enrich the understanding of their practical applications. As ethical considerations take center stage, research exploring the development and implementation of ethical guidelines specific to cognitive architectures is essential. Notably, studies addressing the question of how to efficiently integrate philosophical perspectives into the technical development process could be transformative. Furthermore, in this era of advancing AI technologies, maintaining a dialogue between the technologists and the philosophers is crucial; thus, fostering interdisciplinary collaborations between AI research and philosophy should be a high priority in future research agendas.

Abstract

As artificial intelligence (AI) thrives and propagates through modern life, a key question to ask is how to include humans in future AI? Despite human involvement at every stage of the production process from conception and design through to implementation, modern AI is still often criticized for its “black box” characteristics. Sometimes, we do not know what really goes on inside or how and why certain conclusions are met. Future AI will face many dilemmas and ethical issues unforeseen by their creators beyond those commonly discussed (e.g., trolley problems and variants of it) and to which solutions cannot be hard-coded and are often still up for debate. Given the sensitivity of such social and ethical dilemmas and the implications of these for human society at large, when and if our AI make the “wrong” choice we need to understand how they got there in order to make corrections and prevent recurrences. This is particularly true in situations where human livelihoods are at stake (e.g., health, well-being, finance, law) or when major individual or household decisions are taken. Doing so requires opening up the “black box” of AI; especially as they act, interact, and adapt in a human world and how they interact with other AI in this world. In this article, we argue for the application of cognitive architectures for ethical AI. In particular, for their potential contributions to AI transparency, explainability, and accountability. We need to understand how our AI get to the solutions they do, and we should seek to do this on a deeper level in terms of the machine-equivalents of motivations, attitudes, values, and so on. The path to future AI is long and winding but it could arrive faster than we think. In order to harness the positive potential outcomes of AI for humans and society (and avoid the negatives), we need to understand AI more fully in the first place and we expect this will simultaneously contribute towards greater understanding of their human counterparts also.

Cognitive architectures for artificial intelligence ethics
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(Featured) Moral disagreement and artificial intelligence

Moral disagreement and artificial intelligence

Pamela Robinson proposes a robust examination of the methodological problems arising due to moral disagreement in the development and decision-making processes of artificial intelligence (AI). The central point of discussion is the formulation of ethical AI systems, in particular, the AI Decider, that needs to make decisions in cases where its decision subjects have moral disagreements. The author posits that the conundrum could potentially be managed using moral, compromise, or epistemic solutions.

The author systematically elucidates the possible solutions by presenting three categories. Moral solutions are proposed to involve choosing a moral theory and having AI align to it, like preference utilitarianism, thereby sidestepping disagreement by assuming moral consensus. Compromise solutions, on the other hand, suggest handling disagreement by aggregating moral views to arrive at a collective decision. The author introduces the Arrow’s impossibility theorem and Social Choice Theory as potential tools for AI decision-making. Lastly, epistemic solutions, arguably the most complex of the three, require the AI Decider to treat moral disagreement as evidence and adjust its decision accordingly. The author mentions several approaches within this category, such as reflective equilibrium, moral uncertainty, and moral hedging.

However, none of these solutions, the author asserts, can provide a perfect answer to the problem. Each solution is fraught with its own complexities and risks. Here, the concept of ‘moral risk,’ meaning the chance of getting things wrong morally, is introduced. The author postulates that the selection between an epistemic or compromise solution should depend on the moral risk involved. They argue that the methodological problem could be addressed by minimizing this moral risk, regardless of whether a moral, compromise, or epistemic solution is employed.

Delving into the broader philosophical themes, this paper reignites the enduring debate on the role and impact of moral relativism and objectivism within the sphere of artificial intelligence. The issues presented tie into the grand narrative of moral philosophy, particularly the discourse around meta-ethics and normative ethics, where differing moral perspectives invariably lead to dilemmas. The AI Decider, in this sense, mirrors the human condition where decision-making often requires navigating the labyrinth of moral disagreement. The author’s emphasis on moral risk provides a novel framework, bridging the gap between theoretical moral philosophy and the practical demands of AI ethics.

For future research, several intriguing pathways are suggested by this article. First, an in-depth exploration of the concept of ‘moral risk’ could illuminate new strategies for handling moral disagreement in AI decision-making. Comparative studies, analyzing the outcomes and repercussions of decisions made by an AI system utilizing moral, compromise, or epistemic solutions, could provide empirical evidence for the efficacy of these approaches. Lastly, given the dynamism of moral evolution, the impact of changes in societal moral views over time on an AI Decider’s decision-making process warrants investigation. This could include exploring how the AI system could effectively adapt to the evolution of moral consensus or disagreement within its decision subjects. Such future research could significantly enhance our understanding of ethical decision-making in AI systems, bringing us closer to the creation of more ethically aligned, responsive, and responsible artificial intelligence.

Abstract

Artificially intelligent systems will be used to make increasingly important decisions about us. Many of these decisions will have to be made without universal agreement about the relevant moral facts. For other kinds of disagreement, it is at least usually obvious what kind of solution is called for. What makes moral disagreement especially challenging is that there are three different ways of handling it. Moral solutions apply a moral theory or related principles and largely ignore the details of the disagreement. Compromise solutions apply a method of finding a compromise and taking information about the disagreement as input. Epistemic solutions apply an evidential rule that treats the details of the disagreement as evidence of moral truth. Proposals for all three kinds of solutions can be found in the AI ethics and value alignment literature, but little has been said to justify choosing one over the other. I argue that the choice is best framed in terms of moral risk.

Moral disagreement and artificial intelligence
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(Featured) We have to talk about emotional AI and crime

We have to talk about emotional AI and crime

Lena Podoletz investigates the utilization of emotional Artificial Intelligence (AI) within the context of law enforcement and criminal justice systems in a critical examination of the sociopolitical, legal, and ethical ramifications of this technology, contextualizing the analysis within the broader landscape of technological trends and potential future applications.

The opening part of the article is devoted to the intricacies of emotion recognition AI, specifically its definition, functionality, and the scientific foundations that inform its development. In dissecting these aspects, the author emphasizes the discrepancy between the common understanding of emotions and the way they are algorithmically conceptualized and processed. Key to this understanding is the recognition that emotional AI, in its current stage of development, relies heavily on theoretical constructs like the ‘basic emotions theory’ and the ‘circumplex model’, the limitations and biases of which can significantly impact its effective and ethical application in law enforcement and criminal justice contexts.

Subsequent sections of the article provide a rigorous evaluation of four areas of concern: accuracy and performance, bias, accountability, and privacy along with other rights and freedoms. The author underscores the need for distinguishing between different uses of emotional AI, stressing that the challenges presented in a law enforcement setting differ significantly from its application in other contexts, such as private homes or smart health environments. This examination extends to issues related to bias in algorithmic decision-making, where existing societal biases can be reproduced and amplified. The complex issue of accountability in emotional AI is also dissected, particularly in terms of attributing responsibility for decisions made by such systems. Finally, the author explores the intersection of emotional AI technologies with privacy and other human rights, indicating that the deployment of these systems can challenge individual autonomy and human dignity.

The thematic concerns presented in the article echo the larger philosophical discourse surrounding the role and implications of AI in society. The author’s evaluation of emotional AI is in line with post-humanist thought, which questions the Cartesian dualism of human and machine, and problematizes the reduction of complex human behaviors and emotions into codified, algorithmic processes. The exploration of bias, accountability, and privacy ties into ongoing debates around the ethics of AI, especially concerning notions of fairness, transparency, and justice in algorithmic decision-making. Moreover, the question of who holds responsibility when AI systems make mistakes or violate rights brings into focus the legal and philosophical concept of moral agency in the age of advanced AI.

Future research might delve deeper into how emotional AI, specifically within law enforcement and criminal justice systems, could be better regulated or standardized to address the highlighted concerns. It would be valuable to explore potential legislative and technical solutions to mitigate bias, improve accuracy, and establish clear lines of accountability. Moreover, further philosophical examination is needed to unpack the implications of emotional AI on our understanding of human emotions, agency, and rights in an increasingly technologized society. Finally, in line with futures studies philosophy, it would be beneficial to conceive of alternative trajectories for the development and deployment of emotional AI that are anchored in ethical foresight and participatory decision-making, thereby ensuring a future that upholds societal well-being and human dignity.

Abstract

Emotional AI is an emerging technology used to make probabilistic predictions about the emotional states of people using data sources, such as facial (micro)-movements, body language, vocal tone or the choice of words. The performance of such systems is heavily debated and so are the underlying scientific methods that serve as the basis for many such technologies. In this article I will engage with this new technology, and with the debates and literature that surround it. Working at the intersection of criminology, policing, surveillance and the study of emotional AI this paper explores and offers a framework of understanding the various issues that these technologies present particularly to liberal democracies. I argue that these technologies should not be deployed within public spaces because there is only a very weak evidence-base as to their effectiveness in a policing and security context, and even more importantly represent a major intrusion to people’s private lives and also represent a worrying extension of policing power because of the possibility that intentions and attitudes may be inferred. Further to this, the danger in the use of such invasive surveillance for the purpose of policing and crime prevention in urban spaces is that it potentially leads to a highly regulated and control-oriented society. I argue that emotion recognition has severe impacts on the right to the city by not only undertaking surveillance of existing situations but also making inferences and probabilistic predictions about future events as well as emotions and intentions.

We have to talk about emotional AI and crime
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(Featured) Is AI the Future of Mental Healthcare?

Is AI the Future of Mental Healthcare?

Francesca Minerva and Alberto Giubilini engage with the intricate subject of AI implementation in the mental healthcare sector, particularly focusing on the potential benefits and challenges of its utilization. They open by setting forth the landscape of the rising demand for mental healthcare globally and articulates that the conventional therapist-centric model might not be scalable enough to meet this demand. This sets the context for exploring the use of AI in supplementing or even replacing human therapists in certain capacities. The use of AI in mental healthcare is argued to have significant advantages such as scalability, cost-effectiveness, continuous availability, and the ability to harness and analyze vast amounts of data for effective diagnosis and treatment. However, there is an explicit acknowledgment of the potential downsides such as privacy concerns, issues with personal data use and potential misuse, and the need for regulatory frameworks for monitoring and ensuring the safe and ethical use of AI in this context.

Their research subsequently delves into the issues of potential bias in healthcare, highlighting how AI could both help overcome human biases and also potentially introduce new biases into healthcare provision. It elucidates that healthcare practitioners, despite their commitment to objectivity, may be prone to biases arising from a patient’s individual and social factors, such as age, social status, and ethnic background. AI, if programmed carefully, could potentially help counteract these biases by focusing more rigidly on symptoms, yet the article also underscores that AI, being programmed by humans, could be susceptible to biases introduced in its programming. This delicate dance of bias mitigation and introduction forms a key discussion point of the article.

Their research finally broaches two critical ethical-philosophical considerations, centering around the categorization of mental health disorders and the shifting responsibilities of mental health professionals with the introduction of AI. The authors argue that existing categorizations, such as those in DSM5, may not remain adequate or relevant if AI can provide more nuanced data and behavioral cues, thus potentially necessitating a reevaluation of diagnostic categories. The issue of professional responsibility is also touched upon, wherein the challenge of assigning responsibility for AI-enabled diagnosis, especially in the light of potential errors or misdiagnoses, is critically evaluated.

The philosophical underpinning of the research article is deeply rooted in the realm of ethics, epistemology, and ontological considerations of AI in healthcare. The philosophical themes underscored in the article, such as the reevaluation of categorizations of mental health disorders and the shifting responsibilities of mental health professionals, point towards broader philosophical discourses. These revolve around how technologies like AI challenge our existing epistemic models and ethical frameworks and demand a reconsideration of our ontological understanding of subjects like disease categories, diagnosis, and treatment. The question of responsibility, and the degree to which AI systems can or should be held accountable, is a compelling case of applied ethics intersecting with technology.

Future research could delve deeper into the philosophical dimensions of AI use in psychiatry. For instance, exploring the ontological questions of mental health disorders in the age of AI could be a meaningful avenue. Also, studying the epistemic shifts in our understanding of mental health symptoms and diagnosis with AI’s increasing role could be a fascinating research area. An additional perspective could be to examine the ethical considerations in the context of AI, particularly focusing on accountability, transparency, and the changing professional responsibilities of mental health practitioners. Investigating the broader societal and cultural implications of such a shift in mental healthcare provision could also provide valuable insights.

Excerpt

Over the past decade, AI has been used to aid or even replace humans in many professional fields. There are now robots delivering groceries or working in assembling lines in factories, and there are AI assistants scheduling meetings or answering the phone line of customer services. Perhaps even more surprisingly, we have recently started admiring visual art produced by AI, and reading essays and poetry “written” by AI (Miller 2019), that is, composed by imitating or assembling human compositions. Very recently, the development of ChatGPT has shown how AI could have applications in education (Kung et al. 2023) the judicial system (Parikh et al. 2019) and the entertainment industry.

Is AI the Future of Mental Healthcare?
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(Featured) A neo-aristotelian perspective on the need for artificial moral agents (AMAs)

A neo-aristotelian perspective on the need for artificial moral agents (AMAs)

Alejo José G. Sison and Dulce M. Redín take a critical look at the concept of autonomous moral agents (AMAs), especially in relation to artificial intelligence (AI), from a neo-Aristotelian ethical standpoint. The authors open with a compelling critique of the arguments in favor of AMAs, asserting that they are neither inevitable nor guaranteed to bring practical benefits. They elucidate that the term ‘autonomous’ may not be fitting, as AMAs are, at their core, bound to the algorithmic instructions they follow. Moreover, the term ‘moral’ is questioned due to the inherent external nature of the proposed morality. According to the authors, the true moral good is internally driven and cannot be separated from the agent nor the manner in which it is achieved.

The authors proceed to suggest that the arguments against the development of AMAs have been insufficiently considered, proposing a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework as a potential remedy. This approach places emphasis on human intelligence, grounded in biological and psychological scaffolding, and distinguishes between the categories of heterotelic production (poiesis) and autotelic action (praxis), highlighting that the former can accommodate machine operations, while the latter is strictly reserved for human actors. Further, the authors propose that this framework offers greater clarity and coherence by explicitly denying bots the status of moral agents due to their inability to perform voluntary actions.

Lastly, the authors explore the potential alignment of AI and virtue ethics. They scrutinize the potential for AI to impact human flourishing and virtues through their actions or the consequences thereof. Herein, they feature the work of Vallor, who has proposed the design of “moral machines” by embedding norms, laws, and values into computational systems, thereby, focusing on human-computer interaction. However, they caution that such an approach, while intriguing, may be inherently flawed. The authors also examine two possible ways of embedding ethics in AI: value alignment and virtue embodiment.

The research article provides an interesting contribution to the ongoing debate on the potential for AI to function as moral agents. The authors adopt a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework to add depth to the discourse, providing a fresh perspective that integrates virtue ethics and emphasizes the role of human agency. This perspective brings to light the broader philosophical questions around the very nature of morality, autonomy, and the distinctive attributes of human intelligence.

Future research avenues might revolve around exploring more extensively how virtue ethics can interface with AI and if the goals that Vallor envisages can be realistically achieved. Further philosophical explorations around the assumptions of agency and morality in AI are also needed. Moreover, studies examining the practical implications of the neo-Aristotelian ethical framework, especially in the realm of human-computer interaction, would be invaluable. Lastly, it may be insightful to examine the authors’ final suggestion of approaching AI as a moral agent within the realm of fictional ethics, a proposal that opens up a new and exciting area of interdisciplinary research between philosophy, AI, and literature.

Abstract

We examine Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) critique of the need for Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs) and its rebuttal by Formosa and Ryan (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) set against a neo-Aristotelian ethical background. Neither Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) essay nor Formosa and Ryan’s (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) is explicitly framed within the teachings of a specific ethical school. The former appeals to the lack of “both empirical and intuitive support” (Van Wynsberghe and Robbins 2019, p. 721) for AMAs, and the latter opts for “argumentative breadth over depth”, meaning to provide “the essential groundwork for making an all things considered judgment regarding the moral case for building AMAs” (Formosa and Ryan 2019, pp. 1–2). Although this strategy may benefit their acceptability, it may also detract from their ethical rootedness, coherence, and persuasiveness, characteristics often associated with consolidated ethical traditions. Neo-Aristotelian ethics, backed by a distinctive philosophical anthropology and worldview, is summoned to fill this gap as a standard to test these two opposing claims. It provides a substantive account of moral agency through the theory of voluntary action; it explains how voluntary action is tied to intelligent and autonomous human life; and it distinguishes machine operations from voluntary actions through the categories of poiesis and praxis respectively. This standpoint reveals that while Van Wynsberghe and Robbins may be right in rejecting the need for AMAs, there are deeper, more fundamental reasons. In addition, despite disagreeing with Formosa and Ryan’s defense of AMAs, their call for a more nuanced and context-dependent approach, similar to neo-Aristotelian practical wisdom, becomes expedient.

A neo-aristotelian perspective on the need for artificial moral agents (AMAs)